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•

The plan for these essays, supplied by our editor, suggests
beginning with a paragraph on how each author got in to
the water field. He says th at in his case it was “a flu ke.”
So it was in m ine. I wen t to graduate sc hool aim ing to
become a development economist, based on what I had
seen and learned in nine months or so living in Uganda
and working as an Research Assistant (R.A.) for an
econom ist who was doing a book on the East African
economy as it then was. To make a long, and to me
painful, story short, I had after my second year determined
that I would not b e able to find a thesis advisor from
among the several Harvard development econo mists. In
the midst of the resulting depression I was asked to lunch
by Henry Jacoby, then running the Harvard Water
Program for Bob Dorfman and Harold Thomas. He was
looking for a graduate student on whom to lavish some
suppor t. It took abo ut five minutes for me to see the
w i s d o m o f a b a n d on i n g d e v e l o p m e n t f or
water/en vironm ent.

RFF was a great place to be, espe cially in the early days,
as environmental economics was being created by Blair,
Allen, and John Krutilla through their own work; the work
of collaborators such as our editors Bob Ayres, Bob
Davis, and Bob Ha veman, Tony Fisher, and Kerry Smith;
and that of grantees at universities across the U.S. I
would attribute to the experience of those years a careerlong interest in the preservation vs. develop ment d ebate
broadly; and the U.S. penchant for damming every river
in sight, narrowly. I also became involved in a running
debate with Allen on the choice among environmental
policy instruments, especially the scope for using
econo mic incentives. Later I had a chance to get into
benefit estimation through a project for The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) involving the
adaptation of “indirect” methods to the problem of
freshwater recreational fishing ben efits. More or less
simultaneously, as division d irector, I wa s able to he lp
support Robert Mitchell and Richard Carson as they
crunched out their book on the “contingent valuation”
method (Mitche ll and Ca rson, 19 89). In the process I
became at least literate in the area, though not an active
practitioner until very recently.

In the fall of the n ext acade mic yea r, I was sen t out to
Worcester, Massac husetts, to m eet with Bob Kates an d his
geography grad stud ents at Clark who were, with suppo rt
from Resources For the Future (RFF), studying the very
severe northeast droug ht of the m id 1960 s. Appar ently
our editor, in his then-role as head of RFF’s water
program, had strongly suggested the addition of at least an
economics gradua te student to the projec t team. This led
in turn to:
•

•

•

Ultimate ly to 17+ years of very satisfying work at
RFF, some in water per se (I could never escape the
drought study completely, nor did I really want to) but
most in the environment more broadly.

A dissertation o n “Dro ught an d Wa ter Supp ly
Planning ,” jointly authored with Kates and company
and accepted by Bob Dorfman with the comment that
interdisciplinary work would be the wave of the future.
(Right for me but, in my experience, wrong for the
professio n.)

Now, that last paragra ph was not just a blatant violation of
the one paragraph rule for reminiscence. Read it rather as
a segue in to what w ill pass for sub stance, bec ause wh at I
want to note briefly here are three “triumphs”:

A one-year appointme nt at RFF ’s water pr ogram to
make a book out of the dissertation (Russell, Arey, and
Kates, 1970).
An acquain tance w ith Blair B ower, w ho, wit h Allen
Kneese invited me to stay another year or two and
transfer to their Quality of the Environment division.
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•

In the world of water and dams, I think one can read
the history of the last 30 years as the trium ph of co stbenefit analysis (BCA) or at least of common sense.

•

On the question of policy instruments it seems to me
that economic incentives, at least in the form of
marketable permits and at least in the U.S., have
triumphed. There is another, to me more troubling,
triumph as well; in development and environment one

ECONOMIC INCENTIVE POLICY
INSTRUMENTS

is hardly allowed to question the wisdom of
recommending emission charges to developing
countries.
•

When I came to RFF, Allen Kneese and Blair Bower were
making the case for emission charges. The y pointed to
the operating system in the Ruhr area of Germany (then
West Germany) and encouraged a variety of efforts at
implementation in the U.S., including one involving Rick
Freeman in Maine and another in Vermont that was
pushed by John Hansen, a young lawyer who spent a year
at RFF. There was even a flurry of national level
excitement about a tax on SO 2. I think it is fair to say that
nothing ever came of these political efforts and, on the
more purely economic side, expressions of skepticism
started to be publishe d. Lost, for the time being, was the
dual notion of marketable permits to discharge pollution,
a suggestion iden tified with Dales and Crocker (D ales,
1968; Crocker, 1966 ).

In benefit estimation, direct survey techniqu es seem to
be close to trium phing o ver the trad itional indire ct, or
revealed preference methods, as the methods of
practical choice for actu al project analysis.

COST BEN EFIT A NAL YSIS AND DAMMING THE
WEST
It seemed that the challeng e of dev eloping analytical to ols
with which to address the Hell’s Canyon dam proposal
pushed John Krutilla to make operational the notions
contained in his justly famous paper, “Conservation
Reconsidered” (Krutilla, 1967). This threat to the last
great undammed canyon in the U.S. may be seen as the
high water m ark, if you’ll pardon the expression, of the
dam building excesse s of the 20 th century. Dams are
beautiful and seem further to be powerful symbols or
celebrations of hum an capa bility, especia lly in the face of
the awesome power of nature in the untamed west. So
powerful were they as symbols that the underlying reality
was ignored or lost. The massive transfers from the rest
of the nation that principally helped a relatively sm all
number of large-sc ale farmers grow crops also growa ble
(and grown) in other, naturally watered, parts of the
country were not the foc us of po licy statem ents or project
analyses.

But, as the Clean Air Act’s provisions for punishing areas
not attaining the new na tional am bient air qu ality
standards (KNACKS ) began to threaten to bite and wreak
political havoc, people inside EPA dreamed up the
“bubb le,” “offset,” and bankable emission credits. Taken
together, these amount to a marketable permit system,
albeit one that was h eavily fenced about with restrictions
designed to reassure bureaucrats worried about “losing
control.” As a practical matter, the cobbled together
system allowed new businesses to open in nonattainment
areas. As important for the longer run, people on all sides
of the debate began to notice that the allowed trades led to
cost savings.

If the water resources field generally was the incubator of
serious methodological improvement in cost-benefit
analysis, then the great western dam building period can
be seen as the power source at the heart of that incubator.
As methods were refined it became clearer and clearer
that, from a national efficiency standpoint, these dams
were disasters. Such results were, of course, not enough
in themselves to stop further da ms (no t all so dramatic as
Hell’s Cany on). Bu t it seems in retrospect that the steady
drumbeat of negative evaluations was imp ortant in giving
politicians cover for objecting - whether they were at
another level moved by the incom e transfers or later by
awakenin g environm ental concerns.

The potential of permit trading caught the eye of would-be
brokers for such trade and even impressed some in the
environmental community. Here I would give major
credit to the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), always
the friendliest of the groups tow ard econom ic argumen ts.
The inclusion of an SO 2 permit trading system in the
Clean Air Act a mendments of 1990 may have been the
key to getting so methin g done at last about acid rain. It
seems to have brok en the log jam caused by the Eastern
vs. Western coal fight and the costly requirement for
limestone injection and scrubbing that resulted
(Ackerman et al., 1981 ). (That the price of p ermits
quickly fell was a reminder of the dangers of taking
seriously p olitically mo tivated po licy cost estim ates.)

Therefore, I give credit to the developers of CBA, the
consultan ts to and writers of the Green Book, the so-called
Senate Document No. 97, and those to be found in K neese
and Smit h (1966), for wearing down the political
foundations of these m onum ents to hubris. The resulting
analyses set the stage for Jimmy Carter’s “Hit List,” and
for the adoption of local contribution rules that drove the
stake through the heart of the enterprise.

The apparent success of the SO 2 trading sy stem seem s to
have made tra dable-p ermit believers out of even the Gore
camp in the curre nt adm inistration. They h ave put a
global system of tradable carbon emission permits on the
international climate-chang e agenda. Th e promise of this
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which in turn implied much higher expense than the EPA
project budgets allowed.

system, confirmed insofar as one can believ e the cost
m odels (and inso far as one believes th e reductio ns will
actually be mad e), is that it will make global CO 2
emission reductions hugely cheaper by allowing the U.S.,
Europe, Japan, and Australia to buy reductions in the
poorer nations where massive energy and transport
inefficiencies are rife. The political problem now is that
the Europeans object on what appears to be moral ground;
the U.S. would not suffer enough for past and current
profligacy.

At roughly the same time, Peter Bohm was doing his
famous TV show experiment in Stockholm (Bohm, 1972).
This also showed immunity of respond ents to the efforts
of the survey designer to provoke under and over
statement (“free riding ” and “o verbidd ing”), wh ich is to
say strategic responses. But Peter would an d does stress
that it shows a tendency to state substantially higher
amou nts for WTP in situations described as not involving
any pay ment.

The success of tradable permit systems and the recent
discovery of the potential “double dividend” of any
pollution control ins trumen t that brin gs in government
revenue, seem together to have created a widespread wave
of enthusiasm for the ap plication of such in strumen ts in
the developing country context. “Solve all your problems
at once and suffer no pain in the process,” is only a slight
exaggeration of the mess age. Twen ty years afte r I used to
argue with Allen about just how desirable emission
charges could really be claimed to be, I find myself once
more in the role of a somewhat lonely skeptic about the
wisdom of a wave of enthusiasm that tends to sweep away
objections.

Other researchers took up the challenges as well,
including Robert Mitchell, then at RFF, who had
experience in survey work. H e, in turn, bro ught in
Richard Carson; and the two of them eventually parleyed
an EPA (C arlin) coo perative a greem ent into th e 1989
“bible” for the field.
The largest single intellectual event over the next decade
was the publication of the NOAA “Blue Ribbon Panel”
report in 1993 (NOAA, 1993) that gave a stamp of
fundamental approval – subje ct to cavea ts about ho w to
go about it – and may finally have finished off the
Samuelson objection on the basis of the number of
Nobe lists involved in the panel. This, in turn, was part of
the afterglow from the huge practical event, the grounding
of and spill from the Exxon V aldez in A laska. This
produced enormous amounts of money for studies that
were themselves undertaken with the aim of supporting or
undercutting claims for damage payments from Exxon.

DIRE CT, SU RVE Y ME THO DS OF BEN EFIT
ESTIMATION
Perhaps the mo st drama tic sea change of the past 30 years
has involved benefit (or damage) estimation methodology.
When I was a gra duate stud ent, Samuelson’s dictum that
people would answer strategically if a sked ab out their
WTP for a public good was accepted as the last word on
the subject. Bob D avis’ early work not withstanding, the
possibility that it would be useful to go after WT P directly
via interviews was not taken at all seriously by the
profession.

Ten years later, it is no t a stretch to say that the direct
methods are trium phant, at le ast in the sense that they
have become the dominant benefit estimation technique.
For example, when benefit estimation is attempted for
water quality improvement projects being proposed for
Inter-American Development Bank loans, the method of
choice is referend um-sty le CV. (“Would you be WTP X
for the described water qu ality improvements?”) Indeed,
dealing with the problems of, and suggesting and refining
alternatives to, the “traditio nal” CV approach are the
dominant intellectual challenges these d ays in
environ mental e conom ics journals.

What has happened to turn things around, so that journal
editors complain of being flooded by papers about what
has come to be called “contingent valuation” (CV)? I
would give a larg e share of the credit (or blame if you
happen to think badly of the approach) to Alan Carlin at
EPA. Alan managed to find and protect the money that
supported most of the early efforts, concentrated in Ralph
d’Arges’ group at Wyoming. These efforts began
identifying problems for such techniques and even
suggesting possible solutions. Perhaps most importantly,
they failed to find evidence of pervasive strate gizing in
the responses. (This work also produced the CV tag,
which was dev ised to avoid the word “survey” which was
a red flag to OMB reviewers.) Such reviews resulted in
demands to expand samples, chosen in sophisticated ways

CONCLUSION
All in all, the last three decades have been an
extraordinary period to have been working in water and
environmental econom ics. There have been huge changes
in both the practical and intellectual worlds and these, in
turn, have been driven by excitin g conflu ences of p eople
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and events. The only de pressing fe ature of it all is that the
rate of output of the field has so increased that no one,
except perhaps Kerry Smith, can read fast and long
enough to begin to keep up. Specialization becomes mo re
and more necessary for those who want to make a
contribution. Those of us who started in the ‘60s were
lucky enough to be able to move around easily in what
was then a fairly empty start-up field.
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